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ABSTRACT 
This contribution aims to answer the question which legal boundaries are applicable when domestic 
courts engage in a dialogue with the ECtHR about a Strasbourg judgment. This question is answered 
from an international legal perspective, i.e. the perspective of the ECtHR, and the perspective of eleven 
domestic legal orders. Where possible, this contribution will comment on the practical significance of 
the legal boundaries found, so as to put their significance into perspective.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) have invited the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to ‘deepen’ its dialogue with the highest national courts ‘further’.1 For 
the ECtHR, dialogue is a ‘high priority’ as well.2 Dialogue has been on the agenda of the ECtHR and 
the States for some years3 and, therefore, has turned out to be more than just a fashionable buzzword; it 
is here to stay. The States Parties have even drafted a ‘Protocol of Dialogue’4 to the ECHR. This optional 
protocol will enable the highest domestic judges to request the ECtHR to give an advisory opinion on 
questions of principle relating to the ECHR.5 The requesting court should present inter alia a ‘statement 
of its own views on the question’6 and decides itself ‘on the effects of the advisory opinion in the 
domestic proceedings’.7 The Protocol thus makes it possible for the domestic and European judges to 
                                                          
1 Brussels Declaration (2015), para. A(1)(b); See also: Brighton Declaration (2012), para. 12(c); Draft Copenhagen Declaration (2018), para. 
31.  
2 ECTHR, ‘Annual Report 2017’, p. 9; See also: ECTHR, ‘Annual Report 2016’, p. 16.  
3 See for examples: L.R. GLAS, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights 
System, Intersentia, Antwerp 2016, pp. 129-133.   
4 D. SPIELMANN, ‘Opening Speech’, Strasbourg, 31.01.2014.  
5 Articles 1(1) and 5 Protocol 16 ECHR. 
6 Explanatory Report to Protocol 16 ECHR, para. 12 (provided this is ‘possible and appropriate’); Article 1(1) Protocol 16 ECHR. 
7 Explanatory Report to Protocol 16 ECHR, para. 25; This is possible because the advisory opinions are not binding, see: Article 5 Protocol 16 
ECHR. 
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respond to each other. The appeal of engaging in a dialogue with the ECtHR is clear: it facilitates that 
domestic judges can explain to the ECtHR how their legal system works and why they make certain 
choices within their specific domestic context. Dialogue can, thus, contribute to the smooth cooperation 
between the ECtHR and the domestic judges.8 Nevertheless, not every instance of dialogue has been 
equally eagerly applauded. When the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UK) declined to follow 
the Chamber judgment in the case of Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the UK ‘so that there takes place what 
may prove to be a valuable dialogue’,9 the Strasbourg judges welcomed that decision in the Grand 
Chamber judgment in the same case.10 The Russian Constitutional Court, referring to inter alia its 
British counterpart, has also objected to Strasbourg judgments, ‘proceeding form the need of 
constructive interaction and mutually respectful dialogue’.11 When the right to object to a Strasbourg 
judgment was subsequently laid down in a law,12 Russia did not receive applause. On the contrary, the 
Venice Commission concluded that the law ‘prevents dialogue’ and that Russia ‘should have recourse 
to dialogue, instead of resorting to unilateral measures’.13 Apparently, the British judges have not 
crossed a boundary, while the Russians have, even though they both say they want to engage in a 
dialogue.  
 
Against the background just sketched, this contribution aims to answer the question which legal 
boundaries are applicable when domestic courts engage in a dialogue with the ECtHR about a Strasbourg 
judgment. The answer depends on one’s perspective, as is illustrated by the contrasting views of the 
Russian Constitutional Court and the Venice Commission. More specifically, the answer depends on 
whether it is approached from the ECtHR’s perspective or that of the State Parties, because the former 
looks through the lens of international law, including the ECHR, whilst the relations of the latter ‘to the 
ECtHR are primarily determined by their national constitutions and national laws’.14 Therefore, the 
question that this contribution sets out to answer is answered from different perspectives: the 
international legal perspective (in section 2), i.e. the perspective of the ECtHR, and the perspective of 
eleven domestic legal orders (in section 3). These domestic legal orders have been selected to include 
both predominantly monist15 and dualist systems;16 and systems in which the ECHR has a different 
                                                          
8 See more elaborately: L.R. GLAS, ‘Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights System: inspiration, added-value and means’, 
(2015) European Journal of Human Rights, 258-260.  
9 R v. Horncastle & Others [2009] UKSC 14, para. 11.    
10 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK (GC), Nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 15.12.2001, Concurring opinion of judge Bratza, para. 2 and Joint partly 
dissenting and partly concurring opinion of Judges Sajó and Karakaş.   
11 VENICE COMMISSION, ‘Final Opinion on the Amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law of the Constitutional Court’, No. 832/2015, 
CDL-AD(2016)016, 13.06.2016, Appendix, para. 72, referring to judgment No. 21-П/2015, 14.07.2015.  
12 See also: section 3.8.  
13 VENICE COMMISSION, supra note 11, Appendix, paras. 136, 146.  
14 B. PETERS, ‘The Rule of Law Effects of Dialogues between National Courts and Strasbourg: An Outline’ in A. NOLLKAEMPER and M. 
KANETAKE (eds.), The rule of law at the national and international levels: contestations and deference, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 
2016, p. 206. 
15 E.g. Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, see: W. CZAPLINSKI, ‘International Law and Polish Municipal Law. A Case Study’ (1995) 8 
Hague Yearbook of International Law, 35.   
16 E.g. Italy, UK and Iceland, see: idem.   
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status.17 Additionally, domestic legal orders in which the judges have elaborated on the boundaries to 
dialogue with the ECtHR have been included.18 Where possible, this contribution will comment on the 
practical significance of the legal boundaries found, so as to put their significance into perspective. This 
contribution, in sum, engages in doctrinal research, as it sets out to describe and analyse the applicable 
legal rules.19 Additionally, it undertakes a comparative exercise, both horizontally, by comparing the 
domestic rules with each other (in section 3.12), and, vertically, by comparing the domestic rules with 
the international rules (in section 4). 
 
Answering the question from different perspectives will, as just described, make it possible to compare 
the domestic perspectives with each other and to compare the domestic perspectives with the 
international legal perspective. The latter comparison helps gain insight into whether the ECtHR and the 
domestic judges agree on the legal boundaries that apply to the dialogue between them. If this would 
not be the case, they arguably do not speak the ‘same language’, something that may prove to be a bar 
to a fruitful dialogue. Considering the widespread agreement about the desirability of dialogue, it is 
important to conduct research into potential bars to a dialogue. Research into the boundaries to dialogue 
with the ECtHR is also important, because, in practice, this court, like other courts, can only encourage 
domestic authorities ‘to listen, but not [force them] to act’.20 Moreover, unlike some other courts, the 
ECtHR does not have the power to reverse judgments of the courts that it reviews, to invalidate 
legislation or to impose punitive sanctions. Therefore, room for disagreement with Strasbourg and 
inaction after it has adopted a judgment is particularly broad. Considering this reality, it is important to 
clarify that there indeed exist legal boundaries to the dialogue.  
 
The limitations of this contribution are fourfold. First, the contribution addresses dialogue between the 
ECtHR and the domestic courts, i.e. judicial dialogue, and, therefore, does not focus on other domestic 
actors. This choice has been made, because most abstractly defined boundaries that originate from the 
domestic legal systems have been formulated by domestic judges, for domestic judges21 and because 
these judges are the ‘main interlocutors’ of the ECtHR.22 Nevertheless, section 2 mainly uses the term 
States, because this is the terminology of the EC(t)HR. The boundaries that apply to the States also apply 
to domestic judges, since the ‘duty in international law to comply with the requirements of the 
Convention may require action to be taken by any State authority’.23 Second, the ‘sample’ of the research 
is limited: the domestic perspectives are researched based on 11 domestic legal systems, while there are 
                                                          
17 Constitutional status (e.g. Austria and the Netherlands), ‘super-legislative ranking’ (e.g. Belgium and Spain), ‘legislative ranking’ (e.g. Italy 
and Germany), see: G. MARTINICO, ‘Is the European Convention Going to Be ‘Supreme’? A Comparative-Constitutional Overview of ECHR 
and EU Law before National Courts’ (2012) 23 The European Journal of International Law (TEJoIL), 404.  
18 See: section 3.  
19 P. CHYNOWETH, ‘Legal Research’ in A. KNIGHT and L. RUDDOCK (eds.) Advanced Research in the Built Environment, Wiley-Blackwell, 
Oxford 2008, p. 29. 
20 R. AHDIEH, ‘Between Dialogue and Decree. International Review of National Courts’, (2004) 79 New York University Law Review, 2035.  
21 See: section 3.  
22 N. Bratza, ‘Speech: Future of the ECtHR – Role of National Parliaments’, Strasbourg, 20.09.2012.  
23 Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, No. 2944/06 et al., 18.12.2012, para. 210.  
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47 States Parties to the ECHR. Third, the contribution only considers legal boundaries. Language and 
resource barriers, for example, can form practical boundaries to dialogue, but go beyond the scope of 
this research. Finally, the contribution only analyses one part of the dialogue that can take place between 
the domestic judges and the ECtHR and defines this dialogue as the possibility for a domestic court to 
‘reverse, modify or avoid’ an ECtHR judgment or part thereof.24 This is only one part of the dialogue, 
since the domestic court’s decision is a response to an ECtHR judgment, a response to which the ECtHR 
may reply in a subsequent judgment, which is possible if a comparable case is brought before it.  
 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
This section explains which boundaries exist for the dialogue between the ECtHR and domestic judges 
from the international legal perspective. Section 2.1 describes the boundaries that can be derived from 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The VCLT is considered, because the ECHR 
‘is an international treaty to be interpreted in accordance with the relevant norms and principles of public 
international law, and, in particular, in light of the [VCLT]’.25 The boundaries based directly on the 
ECHR are discussed in two sections: the boundaries that apply in regard to dialogue with the states that 
area party to a case (section 2.2) and the boundaries that apply in regard to other ECHR member states 
that were not parties to the case (section 2.3).  
 
2.1 VCLT 
 
A provision in the VCLT on which the ECtHR has relied is Article 26 VCLT. This provision embodies 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda and stipulates that ‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties 
to it and must be performed in good faith’.26 The States Parties to the ECHR, therefore, must perform 
the obligation to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction’ the ECHR rights in good faith.27 
Consequently, any dialogue with the ECtHR that influences a state’s performance of the ECHR should 
take place in good faith. The ECtHR has also relied on Article 27 VCLT, to emphasize that a State ‘may 
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’.28 Article 
27 VCLT rule codifies the ‘fundamental principle of international law that international law prevails 
over domestic law’.29 This means that, in a dialogue, the States Parties cannot use their domestic laws 
as an argument to justify a failure to abide by the ECHR. The ECtHR does, however, not oblige the 
                                                          
24 P.W. HOGG and A.A. BUSHELL, ‘The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad 
Thing after All)’, (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, p. 80. 
25 Naït-Liman v. Switzerland (GC), No. 51357/07, 15.03.2018, para. 174 (emphasis added).  
26 The ECtHR sometimes relies on this provision in its judgments see e.g.: Janowiec and Others v. Russia (GC), Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, 
21.10.2013, para. 211. 
27 Article 1 ECHR. 
28 E.g. Janowiec and Others, supra note 23, para. 211. 
29 Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 (Advisory 
Opinion), ICJ Reports 1988, p. 12, para. 57; See also: Article 3 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(‘DARSIWA’).  
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States Parties to incorporate the Convention into domestic law; they must secure the Convention rights 
‘in some form or another’.30  
 
2.2 ECHR: THE RESPONDENT STATE  
 
This section zooms in on the boundaries to dialogue that can be derived from the ECHR and that apply 
to the respondent State. The bottom line is that this State must abide by the operative provisions of the 
final Strasbourg judgment that establishes a breach of the ECHR.31 A failure to perform the 
‘unconditional’32 obligation to execute a judgment can engage a State’s international responsibility.33 
Therefore, no dialogue, however eloquent, can justify a failure to execute a judgment.  
 
Executing a judgment means that the respondent State ends the breach, makes reparation for the 
consequences of the breach34 and guarantees non-repetition35.36 These are obligations of result, meaning 
that the ECtHR does not prescribe how the obligation should be fulfilled.37 The respondent State is, 
therefore, in principle free to choose the means by which it will execute a judgment,38 provided the 
means are ‘compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment’.39 Consequently, the 
respondent State can engage in a dialogue about which execution measures it will take. This dialogue 
normally takes place with the Committee of Ministers (CoM) and its Execution Department.40 The CoM 
assesses ‘in light of [relevant] principles of international law and the information provided by the 
respondent State, whether the latter has complied in good faith’ with the obligation to execute a 
judgment.41 
 
The ECtHR occasionally circumscribes the respondent State’s freedom as to the choice of means and, 
thereby, the extent to which the State can engage in a dialogue with the CoM about the required 
execution measures. Most commonly, the ECtHR obliges the respondent State to pay a sum of money 
by way of just satisfaction to the applicant.42 This obligation is unconditional.43 Much more 
                                                          
30 James and Others v. UK, No. 8793/79, 21.02.1986, para. 84.  
31 Article 46(1) ECHR. 
32 Ministers’ Deputies, ‘Decision: Yukos v. Russia’, CM/Del/Dec(2017)1280/H46-26, 10.03.2017, para. 3.  
33 VgT v. Switzerland (no. 2) (GC), No. 32772/02, 30.06.2009, para. 85.   
34 Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (just satisfaction), No. 14556/89, 31.10.1995, para. 34. 
35 The ECtHR does not often mention the third obligation, but this obligation can be derived from, e.g., its statement that execution measures 
‘must also be taken in respect of other persons in the applicant’s position, notably by solving the problems that have led to the Court’s findings’, 
see: Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, No. 71386/10, 25.04.2013, para. 247.  
36 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) (Merits), PCIJ Reports Series A No. 17, p. 47 (which is a ‘precious source 
of inspiration’ for the ECtHR, see: Papamichalopoulos and Others, supra note 30, para. 36); Articles 28, 30-31 DARSIWA; Rules of the CoM 
for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements, Rule 6(2). 
37 Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, No. 26562/07, 13.04.2017, para. 638.  
38 Idem. 
39 Idem.  
40 Article 46(2) ECHR; GLAS, supra note 3, pp. 376-378.  
41 Savriddin Dzhurayev, supra note 35, para. 249. 
42 Article 41 ECHR.  
43 J. POLAKIEWICZ, ‘Speech: Between 'Res Judicata' and 'Orientierungswirkung – ECHR Judgments Before National Courts’, Brno, 19-
21.06.2017.  
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exceptionally, the ECtHR describes which other execution measures the respondent State must take.44 
The degree of specificity of the descriptions varies: the descriptions of individual measures are usually 
relatively precise,45 whereas, for general measures, the ECtHR ‘may propose various options and leave 
the choice of measure and its implementation to the discretion of the State concerned’.46 Strictly legally 
speaking, the descriptions also vary in the sense that they can be an ‘indication’ that does not appear in 
the operative provisions or an ‘order’ that the ECtHR repeats in the operative provisions.47 In the latter 
case, states are not permitted to engage in a dialogue about the described execution measure.48  
 
The respondent State does not have the right to appeal a judgment and to engage in a dialogue with the 
ECtHR in this manner. The parties to a case, however, can ask a Panel of five Grand Chamber judges 
to consider referring a Chamber case to the Grand Chamber.49 The Panel will do so only if the case 
raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the ECHR or a serious issue of 
general importance.50 If the Panel accepts the request, it is possible to engage in a dialogue about the 
Chamber judgment.  
 
2.3 ECHR: THE OTHER STATES PARTIES 
 
The boundaries of dialogue applying to the respondent State, as described the previous section, do not 
apply to the States that are not a party to a case. Still, one can wonder whether these other States should 
‘take into account’ the ECtHR’s interpretation of the ECHR in a judgment to which they were not a 
party,51 because a judgment has res interpretata or interpretive authority.52 Although the ECHR does 
not regulate such authority ‘precisely’,53 the interpretive authority may be derived from the ECHR, the 
ECtHR’s judgments and the ECtHR’s comments on Protocol 16 ECHR, as is explained below. 
Additionally, this section specifies what the phrase ‘take into account’ can mean from the ECHR’s 
perspective.  
  
2.3.1 The interpretive authority of the ECtHR judgments  
 
                                                          
44 GLAS, supra note 3, pp. 383-386. 
45 Idem, p. 389.  
46 Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, No. 21722/11, 09.01.2013, para. 195. 
47 GLAS, supra note 3, pp., 391-392. 
48 Idem, p. 392. 
49 Article 43(1) ECHR.  
50 Article 43(2) ECHR; In practice, the panel refers only few cases for reconsideration to the Grand Chamber: in 2017, about six percent, see: 
ECTHR 2017, supra note 2, p. 156. 
51 Interlaken Declaration (2010), para. B(4)(c); O.M. ARNARDÓTTIR, ‘Res Interpretata, Erga Omnes Effect and the Role of the Margin of 
Appreciation in Giving Domestic Effect to the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2017) 28 TEJoIL, 826.  
52 ARNARDÓTTIR, supra note 51, 825-826; See about this term: S. BESSON, ‘The Erga Omnes Effect of Judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights – What’s in a Name?’, in S. BESSON (ed.), The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14, Schulthess, Geneva 2011. 
53 A. BODNAR, ‘Res Interpretata: Legal Effects of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments for other States Than Those which Were 
Party to the Proceedings’, in Y. HAECK and E. BREMS, Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the 21st Century, Springer, Dordrecht 2014, p. 224.  
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Articles 1, 19 and 32 ECHR point to the interpretive authority of the ECtHR judgments.54 Article 19 
establishes the ECtHR so it can ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the States, 
including the engagement to secure the ECHR rights by virtue of Article 1 ECHR. The establishment of 
a mechanism for reviewing compliance is, according to the ECtHR, ‘one of the most significant features 
of the Convention system’.55 Article 32 ECHR stipulates that the ECtHR’s jurisdiction extends to ‘all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention’ that are referred to it in 
conformity with the ECHR. Since it is the ECtHR’s task to interpret the ECHR – as the court of last 
instance –56 and to ensure the engagements of the States Parties to secure the ECHR rights, the States 
should take into consideration the ECtHR’s interpretation of the ECHR in judgments against other States 
Parties. Considering the content of Article 19 and 32 ECHR, a failure to do so arguably amounts to a 
violation of Article 1 ECHR and Article 26 VCLT.57  
 
The ECtHR has acknowledged that its judgments ‘establish precedents albeit to a greater or lesser 
extent’.58 Furthermore, its judgments serve ‘to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by 
the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by 
them’.59 These quotes already indicate that the ECtHR attaches interpretive authority to its judgments.60 
The structure of the judgments confirms this: they usually first outline the ‘general principles’ applicable 
to the relevant provision and then apply the principles to the case at hand.61 The ECtHR’s acceptance of 
the interpretive authority can also be seen in its autonomous interpretation of certain terms in the 
ECHR,62 since an autonomous interpretation is ‘transversally applicable to all the states’.63 Moreover, 
the ECtHR draws consequences from the interpretive authority of its judgments: it expects that the 
domestic authorities act in accordance with the autonomous ECHR terms64 and that they apply the 
ECHR ‘in the manner that most closely corresponds … to the Convention as interpreted in the 
Court’s case-law’.65 Comparably, the ECtHR can verify whether a State has ‘sufficiently taken into 
                                                          
54 A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, ‘Quelques réflexions sur l'autorité de la chose interprétée par la Cour de Strasbourg’, (2011) 58 Revista da Faculdade 
de Direito da UFMG, 87; BODNAR, supra note 53, pp. 224, 226-227; ARNARDÓTTIR, supra note 51, 824-825; PACE, ‘The Future of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Brighton Declaration’, AS/Jur (2012) 42, 03.12.2012, para. 18; Cf. D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, ‘The Effect 
of the Judgments of the ECtHR before the National Courts – A Nordic Approach?’, (2016) 85 Nordic Journal of International Law, 305.  
55 VgT, supra note 33, para. 84.  
56 Article 35(1) ECHR.  
57 BODNAR, supra note 53, 227; ARNARDÓTTIR, supra note 51, 825.  
58 Pretty v. UK, No. 2346/02, 29.04.2002, para. 75.  
59 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Turkey, No. 25965/04, 07.01.2010, para. 197; See also: Ireland v. UK, No. 5310/71, 18.01.1978, para. 154.  
60 M. O’BOYLE, ‘Speech: The Convention as a Subsidiarity Source of Law’, Skopje, 01-02.10.2010; DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 50, 90;  
BODNAR, supra note 53, p. 227; Venice Commission, ‘Report on the Implementation of International Human Rights Treaties in Domestic Law 
and the Role of Courts’, No. 690/2012, CDL-AD(2014)036, 08.12.2014, para. 52; VENICE COMMISSION, supra note 11, para. 96. 
61 J.H. GERARDS, ‘The European Court of Human rights and the National Courts – Giving Shape to the Notion of ‘Shared Responsibility’ in 
J.W.A. FLEUREN and J.H. GERARDS (eds.), Implementatie van het EVRM en de uitspraken van het EHRM in de nationale rechtspraak. Een 
rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek, Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen 2013, p. 78; E.g. Merabishvili v. Georgia (GC), No. 72508/13, 28.11.2017, 
paras. 181-208.  
62 E.g. Pellegrin v. France, No. 28541/95, 08.12.1999, para. 63. 
63 GERARDS, supra note 57, p. 78. 
64 Idem. 
65 Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, No. 69498/01, 13.07.2004, para. 62 (emphasis added); See also: Kolevi v. Bulgaria, No. 1108/02, 05.12.2009, 
para. 214; Nunez v. Norway, No. 55597/09, 28.06.2011, para. 36; BESSON, supra note 52, p. 141.  
8 
 
account the principles flowing from its judgments on similar issues, even when they concern other 
States’.66 
  
In its reflection paper on the proposal for Protocol 16 ECHR, the ECtHR noted that, ‘[d]espite the fact 
that the advisory opinions would not have the binding character of a judgment …, they would … have 
“undeniable legal effects”’.67 The ECtHR added that it would consider the advisory opinions as ‘valid 
case-law which it would follow when ruling on potential subsequent individual applications’.68 As in an 
advisory opinion, the ECtHR can decide on questions of principle in a judgment.69 When the ECtHR 
does so, a judgment is no different from an advisory opinion and therefore also has ‘undeniable legal 
effects’70 and will be relied upon by the ECtHR as ‘valid case-law’.71 Therefore, the States Parties must 
consider such judgments. 
 
The above leads to the conclusion that the Strasbourg judgments have interpretive authority.72 Indeed, 
the ECtHR’s judges have acknowledged this authority73 and the States Parties have too.74 The States 
Parties must, therefore, in the words of the ECtHR, take the Strasbourg judgments with such authority 
‘sufficiently … into account’.75 Although it is clear that the ECtHR’s judgments cannot be ignored, 
‘taking into account’ is hardly a clear requirement and, therefore, does not help to delineate clearly the 
extent to which the States Parties can enter into a dialogue with the ECtHR. The next section aims to 
clarify this matter.  
 
2.3.2 The obligation to take into account 
 
The dictionary definition of to ‘take into account’ is ‘to consider or remember something 
when judging a situation’.76 ‘To consider’ can be defined as ‘to give attention to a particular subject or 
fact when judging something else’.77 Indeed, the domestic judges must consider the ECtHR judgments 
when adjudicating something else: the case before them with its specific factual and legal context.78 
                                                          
66 Opuz v Turkey, No. 33401/02, 09.06.2009, para. 163; See also: BESSON, supra note 52, p. 138; Yıldırım v. Turkey, No. 3111/10, 18.12.2012, 
para. 66; Fabris v. France (GC), No. 16574/08, 07.02.2013, para. 75. 
67 ECTHR, ‘Reflection Paper on the Proposal to Extend the Court’s Advisory Jurisdiction’, 
<www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2013_Courts_advisory_jurisdiction_ENG.pdf> accessed 20.03.2018, para. 44. The ECtHR cites the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights see: footnote 46 of the Reflection Paper. 
68 Idem; See also: Explanatory Memorandum to Protocol 16 ECHR, para. 27. 
69 This is in particular the task of the Grand Chamber, see: Articles 30 and 43(2) ECHR. 
70 See: supra note 67.  
71 See: supra note 68. 
72 See also: POLAKIEWICZ, supra note 43. It can also be regarded as ‘sound judicial policy’, see: BJÖRGVINSSON, supra note 51, p. 305.  
73 ECTHR, ‘Memorandum of the President to the European Court of Human Rights to the States with a View to Preparing the Interlaken 
Conference,’ 03.07.2009, <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20090703_Costa_Interlaken_ENG.pdf> accessed 20.03.2018, p. 6;  
M. LAZAROVA TRAJKOVSKA, ‘Speech: Ways and means to recognise the interpretative authority of judgments against other States’, Skopje, 
01-02.10.2010; Fabris, supra note 66, Concurring opinion of judge Pinto de Albuquerque; Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. 
Switzerland, No. 5809/08, 21.06.2016, Concurring opinion of judge Pinto de Albuquerque, joined by Judges Hajiyev, Pejchal and Dedov, para. 
60.  
74 Interlaken Declaration (2011), para. B(4)(c); Brighton Declaration (2012), paras. 7, 9(iv); Brussels Declaration (2015), para. B(I)d. 
75 Opuz, supra note 66, para. 163.  
76 Cambridge Dictionary (English), <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/> accessed 19.03.2018.  
77 Idem.   
78 ARNARDÓTTIR, supra note 51, 831; See also: BODNAR, supra note 53, p. 238. 
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Since the domestic judges unavoidably adjudicate something else than the ECtHR and because the 
ECtHR delivers judgments in individual cases, which establish principles to ‘a greater or larger extent’,79 
the domestic judges cannot blindly follow Strasbourg. Therefore, the more the ECtHR’s reasoning is 
intertwined with the facts of the individual case, the harder it becomes to simply copy its reasoning. The 
obligation to take into account, in short, cannot be an obligation to follow the ECtHR. Instead, the 
obligation requires that the domestic judges decide on the relevance of a Strasbourg judgment to the 
case before them and distinguish relevant differences.80 When making this decision, the judges cannot 
rely on domestic law to justify not taking into account an ECtHR judgment.81 These judges must also 
demonstrate good faith,82 which can be interpreted to mean, in the current context, that they give reasons 
for the course they have taken. In the absence of any reasoning, it will be hard for the ECtHR to respond 
and thus to engage in dialogue.83  
 
Since the domestic judges should take into account the Strasbourg judgments because these judgments 
have interpretive authority, the question arises how it can be established to what extent a judgment has 
such authority. I propose that the judgments are neither authoritative nor lacking all authority, but 
authoritative to a greater or lesser extent.84 The authoritativeness of a judgment can be assessed based 
on different factors, as is discussed below. These factors offer viewpoints that do not necessarily point 
in the same direction; they are, therefore, not prerequisites that must all be fulfilled before a judgment 
should be taken into account. The factors are derived from features of the ECHR system and are based 
on a practical consideration.  
 
One factor is the formation that has delivered the judgment.85 The Grand Chamber of seventeen judges 
is the ECtHR’s largest and, therefore, most ‘inclusive’ formation whose ‘reasoning has benefited from 
enhanced deliberation’.86 This formation decides cases raising ‘a serious question affecting the 
interpretation or application of the Convention … or a serious issue of general importance’.87 These 
features make a Grand Chamber judgment, in principle, more authoritative than a judgment of a 
Chamber of seven judges or a judgment of a Committee of three judges.88 Additionally, one could check 
the size of the majority that has adopted the judgment and the content of any concurring opinions.89 
When a nine-to-eight majority adopts a Grand Chamber judgment and when some judges explain in 
                                                          
79 Pretty, supra note 58, para. 75. 
80 As the ECtHR does, see e.g.: O’Halloran and Francis v. UK, Nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, 29.06.2007, para. 43.  
81 See: sections 2.1 and 2.2.  
82 Idem.  
83 See also: GLAS, supra note 3, pp. 162-165. 
84 See also: E. LAMBERT, Les effets des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, Bruylant, Brussels 1999, pp. 304-305.  
85 BESSON, supra note 52, p. 169. 
86 Idem. 
87 Article 43 ECHR; See also: Article 30 ECHR.  
88 See also: A. CALIGIURI and N. NAPOLETANO, ‘The Application of the ECHR in Domestic Proceedings’ (2010) 20 Italian Yearbook of 
International Law, 158; BODNAR, supra note 53, p. 237; CDDH, ‘Report on the longer-term future of the system of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, CM(2015)176-add1final, 03.02.2016, para. 131; ARNARDÓTTIR, supra note 51, 841. 
89 See also: BODNAR, supra note 53, p. 241. 
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their concurring opinions that they have reached the same conclusion as the majority, but for different 
reasons than the majority, that judgment inevitably is less authoritative than a Grand Chamber with a 
larger majority and without concurring opinions.  
  
In addition to the formation, the domestic judges can also check ‘the degree of entrenchment of a 
precedent’.90 If the ECtHR has applied a certain interpretation repeatedly, without overruling it, the 
authoritativeness of that interpretation increases.91 However, when a precedent, even when it is well 
established, is rather old,92 this may undermine its authoritativeness, especially when the consensus in 
the States Parties about a certain matter has evolved.93 A changed consensus is relevant, because the 
ECHR is a ‘living instrument’ that ‘must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’.94  
 
From a practical perspective, the clarity of a judgment is relevant. The clearer an ECtHR judgment is, 
the easier it becomes to take it into account.95 A clear statement is, for example, that ‘a general, automatic 
and indiscriminate restriction’96 on prisoner voting violates Article 3 Protocol 1 ECHR.97 
 
The result of taking into account the same branch of case-law, can lead to different results in different 
States.98 Different results are not only unavoidable since the factual and legal circumstances differ in 
each case, but also because a matter may fall within the margin of appreciation of the domestic 
authorities. A margin of appreciation applies in particular if ECHR rights are restricted, i.e. are 
‘balanced’ against another ECHR right or against a public interest, such as public safety.99 Furthermore, 
different results are possible, because the States may go beyond the protection that the ECHR, as 
interpreted by the ECtHR, offers.100    
 
2.4 SUB-CONCLUSION  
 
Irrespective of whether a State is a respondent State, it must engage in a dialogue in good faith and 
cannot rely on domestic laws to justify a failure to follow the ECtHR. The boundaries to dialogue that 
apply to the respondent State are rather strict. Its room for dialogue is limited by the unconditional 
                                                          
90 BESSON, supra note 52, pp. 161, 169. 
91 Idem, p. 169; See also: LAMBERT, supra note 84, p. 305; CALIGIURI and NAPOLETANO, supra note 88, 158; CDDH, supra note 88, para. 131; 
ARNARDÓTTIR, supra note 51, 841. 
92 See also: CALIGIURI and NAPOLETANO, supra note 88, 158. 
93 See also: BESSON, supra note 52, p. 167. 
94 Tyrer v UK, No. 5856/72, 25.04.1978, para. 31.  
95 LAMBERT, supra note 84, p. 305; Brighton Declaration (2012), para. 23; BESSON, supra note 52, p. 163; BODNAR, supra note 53, pp. 239-
240; ARNARDÓTTIR, supra note 51, 841.  
96 Hirst v. UK (no. 2) (GC), No. 74025/01, 06.10.2005, para. 82. 
97 ARNARDÓTTIR, supra note 51, 841. 
98 POLAKIEWICZ, supra note 43. 
99 S. GREER, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Direction under the European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe 
Publishing, Strasbourg 2000, pp. 24-26.   
100 Article 53 ECHR; BESSON, supra note 52, p. 167; Hutchinson v UK, No. 57592/08, 17.01.2017, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque, para. 41.  
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requirement to execute a judgment by ending a breach, providing reparation and guaranteeing non-
repetition. The respondent State, therefore, cannot engage in dialogue about the result it must achieve,101 
but it can engage in dialogue about the means that it chooses. When the ECtHR spells out part of the 
result to be achieved, tighter boundaries apply. The respondent State does not have the right to engage 
in dialogue by way of appealing a judgment.  
 
The other States Parties have more room to engage in dialogue than the respondent state, although they 
must take certain judgments into account. Therefore, these States cannot simply ignore what Strasbourg 
has said. They are, however, not obliged to blindly follow Strasbourg or to follow the same course of 
action as another State. The extent to which a judgment must be followed depends on its 
authoritativeness, which can be determined with the help of these factors: the size of the majority, the 
content of concurring opinions and the entrenchment and clarity of the judgment. If the State does not 
follow Strasbourg, the requirement of good faith necessitates motivating that decision.  
 
3. THE DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVES  
 
The previous section concerned the international legal boundaries that apply to domestic courts’ 
dialogue with the ECtHR. This section will discuss these boundaries from the perspective of eleven 
domestic legal systems (sections 3.1-3.11) and ends with a section (3.12) that includes some general 
observations about the domestic approaches and that compares these approaches. 
 
3.1 AUSTRIA  
 
The Austrian judges seek to interpret the Convention, which is part of the Constitution, in accordance 
with the ECtHR’s case law;102 that body of case law is ‘the relevant point of reference of [the 
Constitutional Court’s] own interpretation’.103 The Constitutional Court has, moreover, emphasized that 
it ‘“abides” by the ECtHR’s case law, even where this requires it to “depart” from its own, previous case 
law’.104 Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court decided in the Miltner judgment105 that it could not 
follow the ECtHR’s increasingly broad interpretation of ‘civil rights’ under Article 6 ECHR.106 It 
refused to follow, because following would require amending the Constitution, something that only 
                                                          
101 Provided the result to be achieved is clear. If the result to be achieved is not very clear, this opens up some room for domestic judges to 
make different choices.  
102 K. PABEL, ‘Speech: The implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Austria’, Saint-Petersburg, 22-23.10.2015; 
A. GAMPER, ‘Austria: Endorsing the Convention System, Endorsing the Constitution’ in P. POPELIER, S. LAMBRECHT and K. LEMMENS (eds.) 
Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights, Intersentia, Cambridge 2016, p. 95.   
103 GAMPER, supra note 105, p. 94-95.  
104 Idem, referring to VsSlg 15.129/1998, 19.166/2010.  
105 VfSlg 11.500/1987. 
106 GAMPER, supra note 105, p. 79.  
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parliament can do, although the Constitutional Court can call on parliament to do so.107 The 
Constitutional Court additionally noted that the ECHR ‘had developed in a way that led to new 
obligations for the State Parties that they had never been willing to accept’,108 thus criticising the 
ECtHR’s dynamic interpretation of the ECHR.109 Only one year after the Miltner judgment, the 
Constitutional Court furthermore remarked that it could not interpret the ECHR in line with the 
Strasbourg case law at all times, because ‘it was necessary to interpret the ECHR in a systemic context 
with all other parts of the’ Constitution.110 The Constitutional Court thus points out that it must also 
consider other Constitutional provisions than the ECHR (as interpreted by the ECtHR). The approach 
of the Constitutional Court has led it to not only interpret Article 6 ECHR differently from the ECtHR; 
it also adopted a less broad definition of the scope of Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR than the ECtHR111 
and it approaches the question of the ‘same offence’ under Article 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR slightly 
differently from the ECtHR.112 Still, the number of cases in which the Constitutional Court does not 
follow the ECtHR completely, remains ‘relatively small’.113  
 
3.2 BELGIUM  
 
From a formal, legal point of view, ‘the ECtHR’s judgments are not part of the national legal system 
and they only have declaratory force’.114 These judgments are, therefore, only binding ‘regarding the 
concrete disputes resolved’.115 Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court is described as ‘Strasbourg-
friendly’116 and takes into account the Strasbourg judgments, including those against other states, ‘as if 
they were binding’.117 Yet, the Constitutional Court may be reluctant to ‘fully follow’ the ECtHR at all 
times,118 although its ‘deviances … remain rare’.119 The main course of contention seems to be that the 
Constitutional Court is more willing than the European judges to ‘accept the legislature’s assumptions 
and to appeal to the general interest to justify interferences with fundamental rights’, whereas the ECtHR 
                                                          
107 M. STELZER, The Constitution of the Republic of Austria: A Contextual Analysis, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2011, p. 183; PABEL, supra note 
105.  
108 D. THURNHERR, ‘Austria and Switzerland’ in H. KELLER and A. STONE SWEET, A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National 
Legal Systems, OUP, Oxford 2008, p. 361.  
109 GAMPER, supra note 105, p. 79. 
110 Idem, p. 95, referring to VfSlg 11.937/1988. 
111 THURNHERR, supra note 111, pp. 362-363; The author refers to VfSlg 4879/1964, 6648/1972, 6733/1972, 11198/1986; More recently, the 
Constitutional Court has shown also ‘an inclination to follow the ECtHR’s case law’ at this point, see GAMPER, supra note 105, p. 96, referring 
to VfSlg 18.069/2007, 19.341/2011. 
112 See the judgment of 02.07.2009, B 559/08, summarised in English by CODICES, 
<www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll/Codices/Precis/ENG/EUR/AUT/AUT-2009-3-002?f=templates$fn=document-
frameset.htm$q=$uq=$x=$up=1> accessed on 10.05.2018; See also GAMPER, supra note 105, p. 97.  
113 GAMPER, supra note 105, p. 95.  
114 P. POPELIER and K. LEMMENS, The Constitution of Belgium. A Contextual Analysis, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2015, p. 229. 
115 Oxford Pro Bono Publico, ‘Reconciling domestic superior courts with the ECHR and the ECtHR: A Comparative Perspective (Submission 
to the Commission on a Bill of Rights)’, 24.11.2011 <https://issuu.com/opbp/docs/2011_-_echr_and_domestic_courts > accessed 20.03.2018, 
p. 20. 
116 P. POPELIER, ‘Belgium: Faithful, Obedient, and Just a Little Irritated’ in P. POPELIER, S. LAMBRECHT and K. LEMMENS (eds.) Criticism of 
the European Court of Human Rights, Intersentia, Cambridge 2016, p. 119.  
117 G. SCHAIKO, P. LEMMENS and K. LEMMENS, ‘Belgium’, in J.W.A. FLEUREN and J.H. GERARDS (eds.), Implementatie van het EVRM en de 
uitspraken van het EHRM in de nationale rechtspraak. Een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek, Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen 2013, p. 159: See 
also: POPELIER and LEMMENS, supra note 117, p. 229.  
118 SCHAIKO, LEMMENS and LEMMENS, supra note 120, p. 154. 
119 POPELIER, supra note 119, p. 125. 
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seems to attach more importance to ‘evidence-based substantiation’ in this regard.120 According to some 
authors, the Constitutional Court will ‘provide extensive reasoning’ for its deviances;121 according to 
another author, its deviances are ‘implicit’.122 The Council of State, for its part, follows Strasbourg 
judgments, regardless of whether Belgium was a party to a case, seemingly without limiting ‘their effects 
in the Belgian legal order’.123 The Court of Cassation is also regarded as ‘Strasbourg-friendly’ and 
accepts the interpretative authority of the ECtHR’s judgments.124 Nevertheless, this court, due to its lack 
of a tradition of ‘source referencing’, seems to ignore Strasbourg case law or refers to it implicitly or in 
abstracto.125 Furthermore, this court may interpret Strasbourg judgments against other states 
restrictively and seems to be more reluctant than the Constitutional Court to follow.126 The Court of 
Cassation interpreted, for example, the Salduz v. Turkey127 judgment restrictively in the period before 
the legislature took action with respect to the judgment.128 This was, however, not a sign of hostility, as 
the Court of Cassation aimed at compliance ‘in good faith’, ‘while at the same time, for pragmatic 
reasons, it did not want to complicate criminal proceedings to such an extent that, until further action by 
the legislature, investigators would be faced with practical difficulties of considerable importance’.129 
Also more in general, if a Strasbourg judgment goes against its own practice, the Court of Cassation 
does not ‘openly contest’ the judgment, but instead ‘tries to find a pragmatic solution’.130 
 
3.3 GERMANY  
 
In Görgülü, the Federal Constitutional Court explained ‘the relevance of the judgments of the [ECtHR] 
in German law’.131 These judgments, including judgments rendered against Germany, are not binding,132 
but the domestic judges must ‘duly consider’133 the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR.134 Failing to do 
so, ‘may pave the way for an individual constitutional complaint alleging that the corresponding 
constitutional right … and the Rechtsstaat principle have been violated’.135 The domestic judges may 
disagree with the ECtHR, considering that the former may need to decide in ‘multipolar’ fundamental 
rights situations,136 for example in civil law, where ‘conflicting fundamental rights’ need to be 
                                                          
120 Idem. 
121 SCHAIKO, LEMMENS and LEMMENS, supra note 120, p. 154, referring to this example: Const. Ct., No. 153/2007. 
122 POPELIER, supra note 119, p. 125. 
123 SCHAIKO, LEMMENS and LEMMENS, supra note 120, p. 159. 
124 POPELIER, supra note 119, p. 121, referring to Cass. C.08.0384N, 10.06.2009. 
125 Idem, p. 122. 
126 SCHAIKO, LEMMENS and LEMMENS, supra note 120, p. 159; POPELIER, supra note 119, p. 125.  
127 (GK), No. 36391/02, 27.11.2008.  
128 SCHAIKO, LEMMENS and LEMMENS, supra note 120, p. 159, referring to Cass. No. P.12.0106.N, 24.01.2012. 
129 Idem, referring to idem. 
130 POPELIER, supra note 119, p. 125.  
131 K. PABEL, ‘Germany: The Long Way of Integrating the Strasbourg Perspective into the Protection of Fundamental Rights’ in P. POPELIER, 
S. LAMBRECHT and K. LEMMENS (eds.) Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights, Intersentia, Cambridge 2016, p. 165. 
132 E. KLEIN, ‘Germany’ in J.W.A. FLEUREN and J.H. GERARDS (eds.), Implementatie van het EVRM en de uitspraken van het EHRM in de 
nationale rechtspraak. Een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek, Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen 2013, pp. 211-212; BVerfG, 2 BvR 1481/04 of 
14.10.2004 (‘Görgülü’), para. 48. 
133 Görgülü, supra note 135, para. 62. 
134 Idem, para. 48.  
135 KLEIN, supra note 135, 212.  
136 Görgülü, supra note 135, para. 50.   
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balanced.137 The ECtHR, more narrowly, decides on the dispute between an individual and the State138 
and, therefore, may not consider all ‘the legal positions and interests involved’.139 Furthermore, the 
‘actual or legal circumstances’140 before the domestic judge may be different from the circumstances as 
presented before the ECtHR, which also justifies a departure from a Strasbourg judgment.141 The 
Constitutional Court has also formulated the rule that reliance on the ECtHR’s case-law may not 
decrease the protection that an individual enjoys under the Basic Law142 or violate ‘prior-ranking law, 
in particular constitutional law’.143 The domestic judges must justify a departure from the ECtHR 
‘understandably’.144  
 
In Preventive Detention II,145 the Constitutional Court explained more specifically that the ECHR 
obligations should be ‘translated’146 ‘to the specificities of the German legal system’.147 Thus, the 
domestic judges have ‘some leeway’ when they cannot follow Strasbourg precisely.148 Nevertheless, 
they tried to avoid going against the ECtHR,149 aiming for dialogue rather than hostility,150 and they 
regarded the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law as interpretative ‘aids’.151 Therefore, when German and 
ECHR law are incompatible, the domestic judges will try to remove the compatibility.152 In the 
aforementioned judgment, the Constitutional Court was confronted with the incompatibility between its 
own previous judgment that declared certain domestic legal provisions constitutional and a European 
judgment.153 The Constitutional Court removed this incompatibility by qualifying the latter judgment as 
a ‘legally relevant change’, which meant it could set aside its own judgment.154  
 
3.4 ICELAND 
 
The Icelandic ECtHR Act stipulates in Article 2 that the ECtHR judgments, including those against 
Iceland, ‘are not binding in Icelandic domestic law’.155 The explanatory report to this provision clarifies 
                                                          
137 Idem, para. 58.   
138 Idem.   
139 Idem, para. 59.   
140 Idem, para. 50.   
141 Idem, para. 50.   
142 Idem, para. 32.  
143 Idem, para. 62. 
144 Idem, para. 48. 
145 BVerfGE 128, 04.05.2011, 326; Welcomed by the ECtHR in Schmitz v. Germany, No. 30493/04, 09.06.2011, para. 41.  
146 B. BJORGE, Domestic Application of the ECHR: Courts as Faithful Trustees, OUP, Oxford 2015, p. 77.  
147 A. NUßBERGER, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and the German Federal Constitutional Court’, <www.cak.cz/assets/pro-
advokaty/mezinarodni-vztahy/the-echr-and-the-german-constitutional-court_angelika-nussberger.pdf> accessed 20.05.2018, 10.  
148 BJORGE, supra note 149, p. 77.  
149 Idem, p. 91. 
150 PABEL, supra note 134, p. 170.  
151 Idem, p. 167.  
152 BJORGE, supra note 149, p. 92; See e.g. also Von Hannover No. 2 v. Germany, No. 40660/08 and 60641/08, para. 114-123, in which the 
ECtHR approves the new approach of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which it adopted in No. 1 BvR 1606/07, 26.02.2008; See for 
a description of these cases: PABEL, supra note 134, pp. 169-170.  
153 PABEL, supra note 134, p. 168.  
154 Idem.  
155 D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, ‘The Effect of the Judgments of the ECtHR before the National Courts – A Nordic Approach?’ in A. KJELDGAARD-
PEDERSEN (ed.), Nordic Approaches to International Law, Nijhoff, Leiden 2018, p. 105.  
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that domestic judges must interpret the ECHR ‘independently’ 156 and, therefore, ‘regardless of’ the 
Strasbourg case-law.157 The same report assumes nevertheless that the domestic judges will turn to the 
ECtHR’s case-law for guidance when interpreting the ECHR.158 Comparably, the Icelandic Supreme 
Court has noted that the ECtHR’s interpretation should be ‘considered’ and interprets domestic law 
whilst taking into consideration the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law.159 More generally, that court has 
‘sought to interpret Icelandic law in conformity with Iceland’s international obligations’.160 
 
3.5 ITALY  
 
According to the Italian Constitutional Court in 2007, the domestic judges should take the ECtHR 
judgments into consideration when interpreting the ECHR,161 which amounted to an ‘unconditional 
obligation … to give to the Convention only the meaning given to it by the ECtHR’.162 Moreover, in 
2009, the Constitutional Court ruled that the ECtHR’s interpretation of the ECHR had ‘binding 
effect’,163 considering that it is the ECtHR’s task to interpret the ECHR under Article 32 ECHR.164 
Consequently, domestic judges cannot interpret the ECHR differently from the ECtHR165 and they can 
only influence the ECHR’s interpretation where the ECtHR has not yet ruled on a certain matter.166 The 
court added, however, that ‘only the essence of the case of the ECtHR should be binding’.167 Thus, the 
Constitutional Court created some room for divergence from Strasbourg and could, thus, prevent a 
‘direct clash’ when not following Strasbourg entirely.168 The Constitutional Court probably came up this 
technique, because the constraints that it had imposed upon itself gave it ‘too little room for manoeuvre 
with regards to the ECtHR case law’.169 Subsequently, the Constitutional Court has invented other 
techniques that provide room for manoeuvre.170 One such technique is that of distinguishing between a 
relevant Strasbourg judgment and the case before it.171 Additionally, whilst noting that the Italian judges 
should not be ‘passive recipients’ of the ECtHR, the Constitutional Court explained that these judges 
                                                          
156 Idem, p. 106 (emphasis in original). 
157 Idem, p. 107. 
158 G. GAUKSDOTTIR and T. INGADOTTIR, ‘Compliance with the Views of the UN Human Rights Committee and the Judgments of the European 
Court Of Human Rights in Iceland’ in A. EIDE, J.TH. MÖLLER and I. ZIEMELE, Making Peoples Heard: Essays on Human Rights in Honour of 
Gudmundur Alfredsson, Nijhoff, Leiden 2011, p. 513. 
159 R. HELGADOTTIR, ‘Nonproblematic judicial review: A case study’, (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 538; The case the 
author refer to is from 2005.  
160 GAUKSDOTTIR and INGADOTTIR, supra note 161, p. 514; The authors give the following judgment as an example: H 2000, 4480 (section 
IV, para. 2).  
161 G. MARTINICO, ‘National courts and judicial disobedience to the ECHR: a comparative overview’, in O.M. ARNARDÓTTIR and A. BUYSE 
(eds.), Shifting Centres of Gravity in Human Rights Protection: Rethinking Relations Between the ECHR, EU, and National Legal Orders, 
Routledge, New York 2017, p. 69.  
162 O. POLLICINO, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and the Italian Constitutional Court: No ‘Groovy Kind of Love’’ in K. SIEGLER (ed.) 
The UK and of European Court of Human Rights - A Strained Relationship?, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 2015, p. 371. 
163 CALIGIURI and NAPOLETANO, supra note 87, 157, referring to judgment No. 317 of 2009.  
164 Idem; See also: BODNAR, supra note 53, p. 234. 
165 CALIGIURI and NAPOLETANO, supra note 87, 157, referring to judgment No. 317 of 2009. 
166 Idem, 158. 
167 POLLICINO, supra note 165, p. 372 (emphasis added). 
168 Idem, pp. 372-373. 
169 Idem, p. 371. 
170 G. MARTINICO, ‘Italy: Between Constitutional Openness and Resistance’ in P. POPELIER, S. LAMBRECHT and K. LEMMENS (eds.) Criticism 
of the European Court of Human Rights, Intersentia, Cambridge 2016, p. 193. 
171 POLLICINO, supra note 165, p. 372-373. 
16 
 
should take into account the conditions giving rise to the ECtHR’s interpretations.172 More specifically, 
the judges should only follow pilot judgments,173 judgments concerning ‘a specific individual dispute 
remitted to the national court’174 and well-established case-law.175 A judgment does not count as well-
established when ‘some’ of these indicators apply:176 the judgment is innovative, the judgment conflicts 
with other judgments, ‘robust’ dissents have been written, the Grand Chamber has not endorsed the 
judgment or the domestic judges doubt if the ECtHR ‘had correctly considered the peculiar 
characteristics of the domestic legal system at stake’.177 Yet another technique that creates room for 
manoeuvre, is to emphasize ‘the differences existing in terms of contexts’178 between the Constitutional 
Court and the ECtHR:179 whilst the latter performs an ‘isolated’ evaluation, the former performs a 
‘systemic’ evaluation ‘of the values involved by the norm under analysis, and it is therefore obliged to 
[perform a] balancing exercise’.180 
 
3.6 LATIVA  
 
The Latvian Constitutional Court has ruled that the domestic judges are bound to the ECtHR’s case-law, 
also in respect of judgments not issued against Latvia. Additionally, the Latvian judges must rely on the 
Strasbourg judgments when interpreting the Constitution;181 these judgments serve as ‘means of 
interpretation’.182 Still, the Constitutional Court ‘has elaborated its own understanding of the content 
and scope of’ the Constitutional rights.183 A case in point is the reaction of the Constitutional Court to 
the judgment Andrejeva v. Lativa,184 in which the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14 ECHR in 
conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 ECHR, because the applicant was denied a retirement 
pension for the years employed in the USSR, because she did not have Latvian citizenship.185 In 
response, the Constitutional Court maintained ‘Latvia’s principled position that Latvia was not the 
successor to the obligations of the USSR, and that such rights that may have been acquired during the 
times of the USSR could not be binding upon Latvia in calculating pensions’.186 The Latvian judges 
                                                          
172 MARTINICO, supra note 165, p. 77, referring to decision No. 49/2015.  
173 G. NESSI, ‘Constitutionality of legislation imposing confiscation without conviction’, Oxford Reports on International Law, 2016, para. 
H12.   
174 D. TEGA, ‘A National Narrative: The Constitution’s Axiological Prevalence on the ECHR–A Comment on the Italian Constitutional Court 
Judgment No. 49/2015’, International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, 01.05.2015.  
175 NESSI, supra note 176, para. H6.  
176 Idem, para. H12. 
177 Idem, para. H11. 
178 MARTINICO, supra note 173, p. 191.  
179 Idem, p.187, referring to and citing judgment No. 230 of 2012. 
180 Idem, referring to and citing idem. 
181 I. JARUKAITIS, ‘Report on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’, in G. MARTINICO and O. POLLICINO (eds.), The National Judicial Treatment of 
the ECHR and EU Laws, Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 2010, p. 178; M. MITS, ‘Latvia’ in I. MOTOC and I. ZIEMELE, The Impact of the 
ECHR on Democratic Change in Central and Eastern Europe, CUP, Cambridge 2016, p. 216; A. COZZI et. al., Comparative Study 
on the Implementation of the ECHR at the National Level, Council of Europe, Belgrade 2015, p. 20.  
182 I. ZIEMELE, ‘Speech: The Significance of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the 
Case-Law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia’, 02.10.2017, Ljubljana, referring to the judgment of 13.05.2005 in the case 
no. 2004-18-0106 and the judgment of 18.10.2007 in the case no. 2007-03-01. 
183 Idem. 
184 (GK), No. 55707/00, 18.02.2009.  
185 ECtHR, ‘Press release issued by the Registrar. GRAND CHAMBER JUDGMENT ANDREJEVA v. LATVIA’, 18.02.2009.   
186 ZIEMELE, supra note 185.   
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justified their refusal to follow Strasbourg187 by explaining that the ECtHR had ‘assessed only particular 
facts rather than compliance of the contested norm with legal norms of a higher legal force’ and by 
pointing out that the facts in the case before it were ‘considerably’ different from the facts in 
Andrejeva.188 Additionally, the Constitutional Court emphasised the wide margin of appreciation that 
states have in relation to socioeconomic policies.189  
 
3.7 THE NETHERLANDS  
 
With reference to the ‘incorporation doctrine’, the Dutch judges interpret the ECHR as the ECtHR has 
interpreted that document, regardless of whether a specific judgment was rendered against the 
Netherlands.190 Although this approach means that the judges follow the ECtHR ‘loyally’, they do not 
follow ‘slavishly’.191  The Supreme Court interpreted the Salduz v. Turkey judgment, for example, in a 
‘narrow’ manner,192 not so much because it was critical of the ECtHR, but due to ‘the limitations of its 
role within the Dutch constitutional system’;193 it was ‘beyond its judicial task to change the relevant 
legislation’.194 Reluctance to follow Strasbourg, may, however, also be ‘more substantially driven’.195 
In these circumstances, the domestic judges do not follow Strasbourg precisely or only minimally, 
without making this very explicit,196  because they disagree with a European judgment or because they 
‘“translate” the Convention standards into standards which are more easily applicable in domestic 
law’.197 So the domestic judges ‘often appear to use the Court’s case law to supplement, build and refine 
their own sets of standards, rather than applying them exactly as they have been formulated by the 
ECtHR’.198  
 
 
 
 
 
3.8 RUSSIA 
                                                          
187 Idem.  
188 Judgment of the Latvian Constitutional Court, No. 2010-20-0106, 17.02.2011, para. 9 (English translation).  
189 Idem, para. 10. 
190 M. KUJIER, ‘Speech: Mechanisms for effective implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Netherlands’, 22-
23.10.2015, Saint-Petersburg. 
191 G. CORSTENS, ‘De veranderende constitutionele rol van de rechter’, in M. DIAMANT and OTHERS (eds.), The Powers that Be. Op zoek naar 
nieuwe checks and balances in de verhouding tussen wetgever, bestuur, rechter en media in de veellagige rechtsorde, Wolf Legal Publishers, 
Oisterwijk 2013, p. 88.  
192 J.H. GERARDS, ‘The Netherlands: Political Dynamics, Institutional Robustness’, in P. POPELIER, S. LAMBRECHT and K. LEMMENS (eds.) 
Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights, Intersentia, Cambridge 2016, p. 353, referring to Supreme Court judgment of 20.06.2009, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3079; (GK), No. 36391/02, 27.11.2008.  
193 Idem, p. 353.  
194 Idem, p. 354. 
195 Idem.  
196 Idem, p. 355. 
197 Idem. 
198 Idem. 
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As was noted in in the introduction (section 1), the Russian Constitutional Court is now permitted by 
law to establish that a judgment of an international court, including the compensation orders, is not 
enforceable.199 The Constitutional Court renders such a ruling in response to a petition of the 
executive.200  
 
Before the relevant law entered into force, parliamentarians requested the Constitutional Court to declare 
unconstitutional laws requiring compliance with the Strasbourg judgments.201 This request was brought 
against the background of several new ECtHR judgments that met with criticism in Russia (Konstantin 
Markin v. Russia202 and the two judgments discussed in the following two paragraphs).203 In response, 
the Constitutional Court clarified that Russia does not have to enforce a Strasbourg judgment if this is 
the only way to avoid violating ‘principles and norms of the Constitution’.204 The said violation can take 
place, inter alia, if Strasbourg interprets the ECHR differently from what the States Parties agreed to at 
the time of ratification or if the judgment would violate jus cogens.205 Although the Constitutional Court 
rejected the request, it allowed for the development of a law establishing a mechanism to block the 
execution of international judgments violating the Constitution.206 
 
Upon the creation of the law, the Constitutional Court was asked whether the judgment Anchugov and 
Gladkov v. Russia, on the disenfranchisement of persons serving a prison sentence,207 was enforceable. 
The Constitutional Court explained that it would reconcile the ‘letter and spirit’ of the Strasbourg 
judgment with the Constitution.208 It furthermore noted that, because Russia can only ratify treaties that 
are in conformity with the Constitution, Russia ratified the ECHR in 1998 assuming that the Constitution 
complied with the ECHR.209 Therefore, if the ECtHR adopts an interpretation to which Russia did not 
consent in 1998 and which would require amending the Constitution, Russia may stick to the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of the Convention from 1998.210 Because the ECtHR adopted such an interpretation, 
Russia could not execute the judgment.211 
 
                                                          
199 VENICE COMMISSION, supra note 11, Appendix, para. 74.  
200 Idem, Appendix, paras. 74-75.  
201 M. AKSENOVA, ‘Anchugov and Gladkov is not Enforceable: the Russian Constitutional Court Opines in its First ECtHR Implementation 
Case’, Opinio Juris, 25.04.2016.  
202 (GK), 30078/06, 22.03.2012.  
203 L. MÄLKSOO, ‘Russia’s Constitutional Court Defies the European Court of Human Rights: Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation 
Judgment of 14 July 2015, No 21-П/2015’, (2016) 12 European Constitutional Law Review, p. 378-380. 
203 R. HELGADOTTIR, ‘Nonproblematic judicial review: A case study’, (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 538, referring to 
judgment No. 21-П/2015, 14.07.2015.  
204 MÄLKSOO, supra note 206, 381.  
205 Idem.  
206 AKSENOVA, supra note 204. 
207 Nos. 11157/04 and 15162/05, 04.07.2013.  
208 VENICE COMMISSION, supra note 11, Appendix, para. 12, referring to the judgment of 19.04.2016, No. 12- П/2016. 
209 Idem, referring to idem.  
210 Idem.  
211 Idem. 
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The second ruling on the enforceability of an ECtHR judgment concerned the judgment Yukos v. Russia, 
in which the ECtHR ordered Russia to pay 1.866 billion Euros as just satisfaction.212 The Constitutional 
Court clarified that Russia will only refuse to execute in exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances 
exist when the ECtHR interprets the ECHR in violation of a general rule of treaty interpretation, ‘such 
as a wholly novel and unsustainable interpretation …, which departed from the ‘jus cogens’ principles 
of treaty interpretation, or was inconsistent with the Convention’s object and purpose’.213 The court 
concluded that Russia did not have to pay the just satisfaction, because this would go against certain 
constitutional principles.214 
 
3.9 SPAIN  
 
Article 10(2) of the Spanish Constitution requires that the fundamental rights provisions in the 
Constitution are construed in conformity with the international treaties ratified by Spain. The 
Constitutional Court has, in connection to this provision, ‘underlined the interpretative value of [ECHR] 
and the [ECtHR] judgments’215 and has taken the judgments of the ECtHR into account.216 Nevertheless, 
the Constitutional Court has interpreted this provision as not requiring ‘a literal translation’ of the 
ECtHR judgments against Spain, considering that there may be ‘normative differences’ between the 
ECHR and the Constitution.217 The Constitutional Court, for example, upheld a higher threshold for 
finding a violation of Article 8 ECHR than the ECtHR in its Lopez Ostra v. Spain judgment.218 The 
Spanish judge therefore retains ‘flexibility as to the weight it accords to Strasbourg judgments’.219  
 
3.10 THE UNITED KINGDOM  
 
The Strasbourg case law is ‘not strictly binding’,220 but the UK Human Rights Act imposes a duty on 
the domestic judges to ‘take into account’ relevant Strasbourg judgments against the UK and other 
States.221 This duty was interpreted as a requirement to ‘mirror’ the Strasbourg approach,222 by keeping 
                                                          
212 No. 4902/04. 20.09.2011. 
213 POLAKIEWICZ, supra note 43, referring to judgment of 19.01.2017, No. 1-П/2017. 
214 I. MARCHUK, ‘The Tale of Yukos and of the Russian Constitutional Court’s Rebellion against the European Court of Human Rights’, 
Osservatoris Costituzionale, Fasc. 1/2017, 16.04.2017, p. 10.  
215 P.J. TENORIO SÁNCHEZ, ‘Convergence of the Protection of Fundamental Rights Between the Spanish Constitutional Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights’, in A. RAINER (ed.) The Convergence of the Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe, Springer, Dordrecht 
2016, p. 15, referring to judgment 91/2000 as an example.  
216 Idem, 18. 
217 N. KRISCH, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’, (2008) 71 The Modern Law Review, 190. The Constitutional Court 
‘does not make a difference between Convention and jurisprudence’, see: Idem, 188. 
218 Idem, 190-191. 
219 Idem, 189; See also: Oxford Pro Bono Publico, supra note 118, p. 66. 
220 R v. Special Adjudicator, ex parte Ullah [2004] UKHL 26, para. 20. 
221 R. MASTERMAN, ‘United Kingdom’, in J.W.A. FLEUREN and J.H. GERARDS (eds.), Implementatie van het EVRM en de uitspraken van het 
EHRM in de nationale rechtspraak. Een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek, Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen 2013, p. 285. 
222 Idem, p. 287; C.C. MURPHY, ‘Human Rights Law and the Challenges of Explicit Judicial Dialogue’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/12, 
18, 23. 
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‘pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over times: no more, but certainly no less’.223 Over 
time, however, the domestic judges moved from the so-called mirror approach, which ‘implied 
unquestioning acceptance of applicable Strasbourg authority’ to accepting ‘variance of, and deviation 
from, the European Court’s jurisprudence’.224 Nevertheless, the domestic judges rarely disagree with 
the ECtHR225 and they should have convincing reasons for not following it.226 A unanimous Grand 
Chamber judgment is ‘in itself, a formidable reason for’ following Strasbourg.227 The UK judges should 
also follow ‘any clear and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court’.228 The judges, therefore, 
should wonder whether the ECtHR has followed an interpretation ‘repeatedly in subsequent cases’ and 
thus ‘firmly established [the interpretation] in its jurisprudence’.229 Special reasons warranting departing 
from the ECtHR are,230 for example, that a judgment lacks ‘clarity’, is not ‘entirely convincing’ or does 
not speak with ‘one voice’.231 Other such reasons are that ‘the ECtHR has misunderstood or been 
misinformed about some aspect of English law’232 or that the judges ‘have concerns as to whether [an 
ECtHR judgment] sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of [their] domestic 
process’.233 If the judges do not follow Strasbourg, they must give reasons for their decision.234  
 
3.11 UKRAINE   
 
In 2006, Ukraine adopted the law ‘on the Enforcement of Judgments and the Application of the Case-
Law of the [ECtHR]’. This law stipulates that final judgments of the ECtHR that establish a violation in 
a case against Ukraine are ‘binding and subject to enforcement throughout the whole territory of Ukraine 
pursuant to Article 46 [ECHR]’.235 Additionally, the law provides that domestic courts ‘shall apply the 
Convention and the case-law of the [ECtHR] as a source of law’.236 There is some uncertainty as to 
whether domestic judges must also rely on judgments against other states.237  
3.12 SUB-CONCLUSION  
 
                                                          
223 R v. Special Adjudicator, ex parte Ullah, supra note 223, para. 20; See also: Ambrose v Harris, Procurator Fiscal, Oban (Scotland) [2011] 
UKSC 43, para. 19.  
224 R. MASTERMAN, ‘The United Kingdom: From Strasbourg Surrogacy Towards a British Bill of Rights?’ in P. POPELIER, S. LAMBRECHT and 
K. LEMMENS (eds.) Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights, Intersentia, Cambridge 2016, p. 476.  
225 A. DONALD, J. GORDON and P. LEACH, The UK and the European Court of Human Rights, Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
Research Report 83, p. 141; KRISCH, supra note 220, 203. 
226 R v. Special Adjudicator, ex parte Ullah, supra note 223, para. 20.  
227 Cadder v. Her Majesty's Advocate (Scotland) [2010] UKSC 43, para. 46 (emphasis added). 
228 R v. Special Adjudicator, ex parte Ullah, supra note 243, para. 20.  
229 Cadder v. Her Majesty's Advocate, supra note 231, paras. 47-48. 
230 R v. Special Adjudicator, ex parte Ullah, supra note 223, para. 20.  
231 M. AMOS, ‘The Dialogue between the United Kingdom Courts and the European Court of Human Rights’, (2012) 61 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 568; See e.g.: N. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 31, para. 14. 
232 R. v. Lyons [2003] 1 AC 979, 997, para. 46; The ECtHR accepted this reason in Cooper v. UK, No. 48843/99, 16.12.2003, paras. 107, 122-
126, thus, departing from Morris v. UK, No. 38784/97, 26.02.2002.  
233 R v. Horncastle & Others, supra note 7, para. 11. 
234 Idem.  
235 Article 2(1) of the said law. An unofficial English translation of the law can be found in: PACE, ‘Implementation of judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights’, Doc. 11020, 18 September 2006, Appendix III. 
236 Article 17(1) of the said law.  
237 M. GNATOVSKYY, ‘Twenty Years of the ECHR in Ukraine’, EJIL: Talk!, 18.09.2017.  
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The legal boundaries applicable to dialogue with the ECtHR about judgments against one’s own state 
vary widely in the eleven domestic legal systems. In only some States, domestic legislation or case-law 
spells out that these judgments are binding (Belgium,238 Ukraine and Latvia). Therefore, there seems to 
be little room for dialogue about the judgments. In spite of this requirement, the Latvian Constitutional 
Court has refused to follow a Strasbourg judgment against Latvia and the Belgian Court of Cassation a 
judgment against Belgium.239 Therefore, the legal requirement to follow judgments adopted against 
one’s own state does, in practice, not imply that there is no room to engage in dialogue with the ECtHR 
at all. In this connection, it is interesting to recall that the Italian Constitutional Court and the UK 
Supreme Court first demanded quite a lot of themselves and other domestic judges in terms of following 
Strasbourg, but then modified their position in order to allow for more room manoeuvre. Apparently, 
therefore, domestic judges consider it to be important to be able to engage in dialogue, to some extent 
irrespective of their previous position or more abstract proclamations as to the binding nature of the 
ECtHR judgments. 
In some other States, the highest domestic judges do not consider themselves to be bound to the 
Strasbourg judgments (Germany and the United Kingdom) or this is laid down in law (Iceland). In these 
states, it is, from a legal perspective at least, possible to fully engage in dialogue about the judgments 
against one’s own State. Russia goes some steps further, thereby stretching the boundaries to dialogue 
the most, to the extent that the Constitutional Court is no longer engaging in dialogue according to the 
Venice Commission.240 In Russia, the executive can ask the judiciary to declare that a Strasbourg 
judgment, including the award of just satisfaction, cannot be executed. In the other states, such a 
procedure does not exist and the award of just satisfaction does not seem to be the subject of dialogue. 
Nevertheless, the domestic judges, including the Russian, have expressed their willingness to consider 
Strasbourg judgments and follow these judgments principle, while still permitting for some exceptions. 
Moreover, in practice, they usually follow the ECtHR and even try to solve incompatibilities between 
domestic law and the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR, even when they are, legally speaking, not 
obliged to do so (Germany and Iceland). 
 
The variation in boundaries can also be observed, although comparably less, when looking at the 
boundaries that apply to engaging in a dialogue about the judgments against other States. Some domestic 
judges are bound to these judgments (Latvia and previously Italy) or these judgments are probably a 
source of law (Ukraine). Other domestic judges may take into account the Strasbourg judgments, usually 
                                                          
238 Regarding the concrete dispute.  
239 As described in Vermeire v. Belgium, No. 12849/87, 29.11.1991, para. 25.  
240 As was already noted in the introduction (section 1), see: VENICE COMMISSION, supra note 11, Appendix, paras. 136, 146. 
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regardless of whether they were issued against their own State241 (Austria, Germany, Iceland, 
Netherlands, Russia and the UK).242    
 
More in general it must be observed that, although the legal boundaries indeed vary widely, the practical 
differences between what the highest domestic judges do with relevant Strasbourg precedents seems to 
vary less:  they generally follow the ECtHR. Additionally, the domestic judges who are legally bound 
to Strasbourg, still create room for manoeuvre, and domestic judges who are legally not bound to 
Strasbourg, still usually follow. This finding points to the importance of both dialogue, as many domestic 
judges want to be able to engage in it, irrespective of domestic prescripts, and of complying with 
Strasbourg, as it is something many domestic judges want, irrespective of whether they are legally 
obliged to do so. 
 
When considering more specifically the reasons not to only take a European judgment into account, but 
also to follow it, this may happen, because interpretation is constant, well-established or clear (Italy and 
UK) or that a judgment is a pilot (Italy) or Grand Chamber judgment (UK).  
 
The most common and general reason not to follow is that the Strasbourg case-law is incompatible with 
constitutional fundamental rights or other norms (Germany, Italy, Russia and Spain). More specifically, 
the domestic judges may find that the ECtHR ‘has gone too far’. Going too far includes going beyond 
what the States accepted when ratifying the ECHR (Austria243 and Russia), issuing a judgment that is 
innovative and/or in conflict with previous judgments (Italy) or defying the general rules of treaty 
interpretation (Russia). Alternatively, the domestic judges are not convinced by Strasbourg, because of 
dissenting opinions or because the Grand Chamber has not endorsed an interpretation (Italy). Other 
reasons to see a judgment as unconvincing is that the ECtHR did not understand (the UK and Italy) or 
insufficiently accommodated (UK) the domestic system. Furthermore, the domestic judges may invoke 
the margin of appreciation to diverge from Strasbourg (Latvia) or point to normative differences between 
themselves and Strasbourg (Spain). Additionally, the domestic judges may consider that they cannot 
follow Strasbourg, because they are confronted with another context than the ECtHR. The Austrian 
Constitutional Court, unlike the ECtHR does not consider the ECHR, but also to other constitutional 
provisions, and the German Federal Constitutional Court has explained that it may have to decide in 
multipolar situations, whereas the ECtHR looks a case between the applicant and the respondent State. 
The Italian Constitutional Court reasoned along comparable lines. Also with reference to the different 
contexts, the domestic judges may not follow Strasbourg precisely, because they engage in a process 
                                                          
241 See also: BODNAR, supra note 53, p. 252: ‘In most countries, ECtHR jurisprudence is treated as a whole body of case-law, without 
distinguishing between judgments having res judicata and res interpretata status’. 
242 See also: CALIGIURI and NAPOLETANO, supra note 88, 156: ‘The majority of courts in the Contracting States do not take the view that they 
are effectively bound by Strasbourg jurisprudence’. 
243 The Austrian Court only mentioned this reason once however, see the Miltner judgment discussed in section 3.1.   
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adapting the European standards to the specificities of their domestic legal system (Germany and the 
Netherlands). 
 
A refusal to follow with reference to the constitution, may, however, also be less ‘substantially driven’244 
and may instead have to do with distribution of powers in the domestic setting. Following Strasbourg 
may imply amending the constitution or another type of domestic law, which is something that only 
parliament may be entitled to do, not the judiciary (Austria, Belgium245 and the Netherlands). In these 
circumstances, the hands of domestic courts are tied and they have to wait until the legislature enters the 
dialogue and takes legislative action.  
 
Regardless of the reason that applies for not following Strasbourg, some judges have clarified that they 
will motivate a departure from the Strasbourg case-law (Germany and the UK). Not all judges are so 
vocal however. The Dutch judges may silently apply Strasbourg case-law in a minimal manner, without 
pointing out that and why they engage in dialogue.  
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
The answers to the questions which boundaries apply to dialogue with the ECtHR from the international 
legal perspective and from eleven domestic perspectives have already been given in the sub-conclusions 
in sections 2.4 and 3.12. Therefore, this conclusion will focus on comparing these answers. As was noted 
in section 1, this comparison makes it possible to see if the ECtHR and the domestic judges speak the 
same ‘language’ when engaging in dialogue. 
 
As for the differences between the two perspectives: the requirement of good faith that features in the 
international legal system does not feature as such in the domestic systems or the judgments of the 
domestic judges. Nevertheless, the requirement can be read into the requirement that some domestic 
judges impose on themselves to reason any disagreement with Strasbourg. An important difference 
between the international system and several domestic systems is the possibly to rely on domestic law 
as a justification for failing to follow the ECtHR. The domestic judges are prepared to or allowed to 
follow the ECtHR, provided they stay within what is permissible under the constitution, whereas the 
international perspective does not permit invoking domestic law to justify a failure to implement the 
ECHR. Furthermore, from the international perspective, the State Party that is not a party to a case has 
comparably more room to engage in dialogue than the respondent State. This distinction is not relevant 
to each domestic system: the duty that applies when the State is a respondent state may be the same as 
                                                          
244 GERARDS, supra note 195, p. 354. 
245 As to execution of Marckx v. Belgium, No. 6833/74, 13.07.1979, the ECtHR ‘took the view that it was for the legislature to execute the 
Marckx judgment’, see: E. LAMBERT, The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe Publishing, 
Strasbourg 2002, p. 8.  
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when it is a non-respondent State. In short, the boundaries that apply from the international legal 
perspective and a domestic perspective may differ. This can imply that the domestic systems set 
boundaries that are more or less strict than the international perspective, as is explained below.  
 
In some domestic systems, the judges seem to have less room for dialogue than the international 
perspective would permit. This is the case when the judges are bound to the Strasbourg judgments to 
which their state was not a party, whereas they ‘only’ need to take into account such judgments from 
the international perspective. For these judges, Protocol 16 ECHR will be of particular benefit, because 
the Protocol enables them to request an advisory opinion, about which they can engage in dialogue, 
since the advisory opinion is not binding.246 Nevertheless, even when, from a legal perspective, there 
seems to be no or hardly any room for dialogue, the domestic judges may still engage in dialogue with 
the ECtHR under very exceptional circumstances, meaning that the domestic and international 
perspectives differ less in practice than on paper.  
 
In other domestic systems, the judges have more room to engage in dialogue than the international 
perspective envisages. These domestic judges do not consider themselves bound to the Strasbourg 
judgments against their own State, whilst the international perspective requires that these judgments are 
executed, including by the judiciary if necessary. This domestic stance implies that the domestic judges 
may not change their case-law to prevent new violations, not that they obstruct the implementation of 
individual execution measures. This is only different in Russia, where the domestic judges can even halt 
the payment of just satisfaction. However, even these domestic judges aim to follow Strasbourg as a 
rule, meaning that the difference in approach between these domestic judges and the ECtHR will, in 
practice, not lead to many clashes and have indeed not led to many clashes.    
 
A striking similarity between the international perspective and some domestic perspectives is the 
existence of the duty to take into account the ECtHR’s case-law, which depends on the interpretive 
authoritativeness of an ECtHR judgment from the international perspective. Moreover, some of the 
factors that can help establish whether a judgment has interpretive authority, can also be found in the 
case law of domestic judges.247 However, not all the factors that the domestic judge rely on to determine 
whether they need to take into account the Strasbourg case-law, have something to do with the 
interpretive authority of a judgment, because some factors depart from the logic of the domestic system. 
These factors include that the Strasbourg case-law is incompatible with the domestic system, that the 
ECtHR has gone too far, that the ECtHR did not understand the domestic system or insufficiently 
accommodated that system and that the domestic judges’ hands are tied due to the distribution of powers.   
 
                                                          
246 Article 5 Protocol 16 ECHR.  
247 Formation, size of the majority, separate opinions, entrenchment and clarity. 
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Considering the above, it must be concluded that the domestic judges and the ECtHR hardly speak the 
same language when it comes to defining the boundaries to dialogue. Both perspectives set different 
boundaries and may define the scope of what is permissible differently. Moreover, even when the two 
perspectives seem to speak ‘the same language’, because they both refer to ‘taking into account’ this 
does not necessarily mean that they rely on the same factors to determine whether a judgment must be 
considered. Therefore, clashes are an ever-present possibility. However, it has also already been 
concluded that the clashes do not happen a lot in practice, due to the willingness of the domestic judges 
to follow their European counterparts. 
 
Returning to the example in the introduction, the question arises if the difference in how the Russian 
and British judges’ attempts to engage in dialogue have been received, can be explained with reference 
to the boundaries of the international legal system. Interestingly, the British judges stayed within these 
boundaries, because they refused to follow the Chamber judgment, before the Grand Chamber adopted 
its judgment. Due to the referral procedure, the Chamber judgment never became final.248 Consequently, 
the obligation to execute the final judgment never materialized and the British judges could not fail to 
fulfil this obligation.249 The Russian judges, on the contrary, have obstructed fulfilling this obligation. 
Nevertheless, I do not think that this legal technicality fully explains the difference in reception, since 
the ECtHR has also accepted that the British judges departed from a judgment that had become final. 
The ECtHR accepted this, based on the arguments of the domestic judges and the government’s 
clarification of domestic laws.250 The ECtHR, therefore, like some domestic judges (as explained in 
section 3.12) permits room for dialogue, irrespective of the precise legal obligation that the ECHR 
imposes on the state. Rather, the difference in reception may be explained by the fact that the Russians 
have created a procedure for not executing individual and general measures on the request of the 
executive, whereas the UK does not know such a procedure and its judges engage in dialogue about the 
general measures only. It is relatively hard to know which general measures are required, because their 
scope is broad and because the ECtHR normally only stipulates individual measures rather precisely.251 
Therefore, there is more room to engage in dialogue about general than individual measures. The 
requirement of good faith can also help explain the difference.252 The ECtHR seems convinced that the 
UK judges engaged in a ‘bona fide dialogue’.253 Therefore, the ECtHR welcomes the dialogue – even 
when the UK judges would not strictly stay within the international legal boundaries. The involvement 
of the executive in the case of Russia probably makes it harder to believe that the dialogue is performed 
in good faith and, therefore, the dialogue is received with little enthusiasm.254  
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